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Regulation I.  Introduction 
A substantial body of evidence suggests that competition-friendly regulation positively 
affects the efficiency of the economy. Henry [2000], Laeven [2003], and Bekaert, Harvey 
and Lundblad [2005], among others, show that equity market liberalization decreases the 
cost of capital and spurs aggregate growth; while Jayaratne and Strahan [1996] and Huang 
[2007] study the beneficial effects of the deregulation permitting statewide branching and 
interstate banking in the US (see also Kobayakawa, de Serres, Slok and Vartia [2007]). 
These studies focus on the direct impact of deregulation in a single sector, thus 
disregarding the role of sector specificities in explaining the potentially different effects of a 
legislative change across sectors. In contrast to the previous studies, this paper focuses on a 
legislative change that took place in many countries to guarantee and intensify competition 
across all sectors; and it analyzes the different effects of such a change across sectors. In 
particular, we analyze the changes in competition policy on mergers and acquisitions that 
occurred in 19 industrial countries over the last three decades and examine their impact on 
financial and non-financial firms. The analysis highlights the importance of the existing 
supervisory arrangements. 
Competition policy is an important regulatory component affecting the size and market 
power of firms. With the exception of the United States, Canada and Germany, most 
industrial countries have introduced or strengthened this policy over the last three decades 
and have applied it to all (or almost all) sectors of the economy. Thus, competition policy 
has become an important reality in most countries only recently and its introduction (or 
strengthening) represents a significant policy shift in all countries involved. Within this 
policy domain, merger control has assumed a prominent role due to the high number and 
the value of the mergers and acquisitions that took place over the last three decades in the  
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United States (Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford [2001]) and other countries (Evenett [2004]), 
in most sectors including the financial sector (Berger, Kashyap and Scalise [1995], Dermine 
[2006]). 
As competition policy is a general form of regulation, changes in its design are well 
suited to examine the distinct impact of the same regulation across different sectors. In this 
sense, the banking sector is ideal to investigate the potential role of sector specificities and 
regulation in determining the effect of a legislative change introduced across all sectors. 
Banking is one of the most regulated sectors in the economy. Its regulation is very pervasive 
and, in most countries, dates back to well before the introduction of competition policy. 
Banking supervision entails a specific control of mergers and acquisitions for stability 
purposes, which interrelates directly with competition policy. Moreover, supervisory 
control is very different in nature. Apart from pursuing different objectives, supervisory 
control is in most instances opaque and more subject to discretion. This leads to the risk of 
implicit or opaque regulatory barriers in financial markets, which can be partly offset, or at 
least altered, by the introduction of a more transparent and more efficient-oriented form of 
regulation such as competition policy. 
To assess the impact of the introduction or strengthening of competition policy, we 
collect a unique data set on legislative changes affecting the review (“control”) of mergers 
and acquisitions (M&As) in 19 industrial countries (United States, Canada and seventeen 
European countries) between 1987 and 2004. The data set covers the changes that occurred 
in the competition laws and competition authorities enforcing the merger control (both in 
banking and other sectors) as well as the legal arrangements of the supervisory control of 
bank merger reviews.  
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We aggregate this information and construct various indexes describing the crucial 
dimensions of the legal arrangements and examine the impact of changes in the competition 
control of mergers and acquisitions on non-financial firms and banks. Specifically, to 
isolate the effects from other institutional and macro changes, we conduct an event study to 
analyze the immediate changes in the market valuations. Our economic hypothesis comes 
from the standard industrial organization argument that the introduction or strengthening of 
merger control should decrease the future valuations of firms as it imposes limits to the 
growth and the market power of firms. Anticipating this, investors should react negatively 
to announcements of legislative changes leading to more competition-oriented control of 
M&As. 
Our analysis finds striking differences between the impacts of the legislative changes on 
non-financial firms and banks. Legislative changes strengthening competition policy 
decrease the valuations of firms, but increase the market valuations of banks. The decrease 
in the valuations of firms is in line with our predictions, but the increase in the banks’ stock 
returns is unexpected. The differential stock reactions are further underscored by the Crédit 
Agricole-Crédit Lyonnais and the AMRO-Antonveneta-Banca Popolare Italiana merger 
episodes that occurred respectively in France in 2003 and Italy in 2005 that we discuss as 
case studies, and by a balance-sheet analysis of merger targets and acquirers before and 
after the legislative changes. 
To explain the differential effects, we perform a cross sectional analysis where we regress 
the individual bank stocks on a series of variables capturing important institutional aspects 
of the competition control, the supervisory control specific to the banking sector, general 
institutional quality and individual bank characteristics. The analysis identifies the 
transparency of the supervisory process as a key driver of the positive reaction of the  
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cumulative abnormal bank stock returns: The less transparent are the supervisory reviews in 
a given country – i.e., when the supervisory decisions are not published – the higher the 
valuation gains of banks in anticipation of changes in the competition control of M&As. 
Thus, the supervisory regime in place in a country at the time of legislative changes 
implementing a more competition-oriented control of M&As has an important effect on the 
banks’ valuations. 
These results show the importance of sector characteristics and of the interrelation 
between different regulations in explaining the effects of a particular legislative change. 
These results also point out important tradeoffs present in bank regulation. The fact that 
bank investors react positively to the introduction of a more competitive, efficiency-
oriented control suggests that they consider supervisory control also as potentially value-
reducing. Investors may consider the stability objective of the supervisory policy at times 
conflicting with efficiency and bank value maximization. For example, supervisors may 
occasionally promote specific mergers in order to save weak or failing banks.  
More importantly, investors may discount in their valuations the negative effect on 
efficiency of the potential discretion embedded in the supervisory process, in particular 
when this process is opaque. Such discretion may lead to the attitude of the supervisors, 
often observed in cross border mergers, of using the supervisory review to favor domestic 
concentration over foreign penetration. An important example of the potential abuse of the 
supervisory review is the well-known takeover of Antonveneta by ABN AMRO (discussed in 
detail in the paper), which culminated in the resignation of the Governor of the Bank of 
Italy, Mr. Fazio, and, more importantly, a major legislative reform of the control of M&As 
in Italy and of the governance of the Italian supervisor. The attempt of Mr. Fazio to favor a 
domestic bidder, Banca Populare Italiana, over ABN AMRO was widely perceived to be  
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linked to his desire to protect national interests rather than being motivated by stability 
considerations. 
Overall our results suggest that the strengthening of the competition control of M&As 
can play an important role in limiting supervisory discretion, thereby offsetting the potential 
adverse side effects on openness and efficiency that are introduced through the supervisory 
policies. More generally, the exact configuration of legal arrangements governing 
competition and supervisory control of bank mergers matters for bank and firm 
performance in the economy. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We review the related literature in Section 
II and provide details on the institutional arrangements for the competition control of 
M&As in Section III. Section IV describes the data and the methodology we use in our 
econometric exercise; and Section V reports the estimated effects of the changes in 
competition control on firms and banks. Section VI describes the explanatory variables we 
use in the cross-sectional analysis and reports the results showing the importance of features 
of the supervisory control in determining the peculiar stock market valuations of individual 
banks across the sample countries. We conclude in Section VII. 
II. Related Literature 
Our paper relates to several strands of literature. A vast literature has addressed the role 
of the legal architecture for the functioning of financial systems.
1 Rossi and Volpin [2004] 
for example have shown that legal origin and shareholder rights influence the volume of 
M&As (across all sectors) and the direction of cross-border deals. However no paper, as far 
                                                 
1 In their seminal work La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny [1998] have illustrated the influence 
of legal origins, formalism, and enforcement problems on the structure and efficiency of financial systems (see 
also Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer [2003] and Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer [2007] for 
example).  
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as we are aware of, has analyzed the impact of changes in competition policy on merger 
valuation, despite the importance of this policy for the development of industry structures. 
Our paper is also related to a more focused literature that deals with the effects of 
financial regulation on banking and real activity. Jayaratne and Strahan [1998], Demirgüç-
Kunt, Laeven and Levine [2004], and Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales [2006] provide 
evidence that too restrictive banking regulations can lead to substantial costs in terms of 
growth and welfare, while Barth, Caprio and Levine [2006] document that banking 
regulation and supervisory interventions are often the cause of substantial inefficiencies in 
financial systems, in particular in developing countries. Recent empirical work by Donzé 
[2006] documents a correlation between measures of supervisory independence and 
adherence to law and banking sector health. Differently from this literature, we focus on the 
legal arrangements for supervisory review of bank mergers and point to their potential and 
often unintended side effects in terms of lower bank valuations. 
By highlighting the differential effects of the competition control of M&As on banks’ 
valuations and by explaining them with sector specificities, our paper is also related to the 
literature on the specialness of banks (Dewatripont and Tirole [1994], Goodhart, Hartmann, 
Llewellyn, Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod [1998] and Herring and Litan [1995]); and to the 
literature on competition in banking (Keeley [1990] and Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz 
[2000] for example; see Carletti [2008] for a survey). Our work provides support for the 
idea that more competition can be beneficial in the banking sector (as in Boyd and De 
Nicolo [2005], Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine [2006], Claessens and Laeven [2005]).  
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Finally, our paper is connected to the research dealing with the causes and consequences 
of banking consolidation (see Berger, Demsetz and Strahan [1999] for a detailed survey).
2 
However this literature has so far mostly overlooked the effects of changes in the merger 
review procedures on the consolidation process (except for a discussion in Carletti and 
Hartmann [2003]). 
III.  Competition Control of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As). 
Over the last three decades competition policy has become an important regulatory tool 
across all sectors of the economy. With the exception of the United States, where 
competition policy started with the Sherman Act of 1890 and the Clayton Act of 1914, and 
Germany, where it was formalized with the Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen in 
1958,
3 most industrial countries introduced competition policy only in the early 1990s 
and/or strengthened it subsequently. In all cases, this policy shift constituted a significant 
change for the countries involved since it entailed limits to the growth and power of firms 
with potential consequent effects for the real activity. Furthermore, as a general policy 
affecting all (or almost all) sectors, the shift was most likely exogenous to changes or 
existing regulations in any particular industry and thus well suited to examine how the 
same, general policy may have different effects across sectors depending on sector 
characteristics. 
Our aim is to document this important policy shift and to analyze its economic effects. 
We focus in particular on the competition reviews of M&As (hence, competition control or 
                                                 
2 This literature has looked at the various effects of consolidation. Consolidation may soften competition and 
shrink loan supply (unless accompanied by de novo bank entry as documented by Berger, Saunders, Scalise 
and Udell [1998]), modify individual and aggregate liquidity (Carletti, Hartmann and Spagnolo [2007]), and 
increase bank riskiness (Boyd and Runkle [1993], Demsetz and Strahan [1997]). 
3 “Act against Restraints on Competition”. The merger control chapter was introduced in 1973.  
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merger control) and analyze the effects of their introduction or strengthening for banks and 
non-financial firms. We choose the dichotomy “non-financial firms versus banks” to 
highlight the potential differential effects across sectors since banking is subject to a 
specific sector regulation (which was already present in all our sample countries at the time 
of the legislative changes concerning competition control). This difference in regulation 
adds a key sectoral component to our analysis.  
We start in this section by describing the general characteristics of competition control; 
and we turn to the specificity of the banking sector in the control of M&As in Section V. 
A.  Scope and Design 
The main objective of the competition control of M&As is the prevention of excessive 
market concentration. The concern is that excessive concentration may cause a substantial 
lessening of competition or the creation (or strengthening) of a dominant position, which 
may lead to increase prices and reduce consumer welfare. Several factors need to be taken 
into account when evaluating the competitive effects of a proposed merger. These include 
the degree of concentration of the relevant markets (measured through either parties’ 
combined market share or the Herfindahl-Hirschman index), the possibility of entry and the 
presence of potential entrants, and the evolution of the market and of the parties’ market 
shares in the years before the proposed transaction. In some countries, it is also evaluated 
whether the merger leads to efficiency gains, for example through a larger scale, which 
would offset any price impacts of the increase in concentration (the so-called efficiency 
defense). 
An important factor in the evaluation of merger proposals is also whether criteria other 
than competition are taken into account. In particular, the competition law in some 
countries contains a provision that allows the competent authorities to weigh competition  
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considerations against other presumed social or political benefits, such as the preservation 
of employment, technical achievements or certain services in a specific region. When this is 
the case, the competition control is weakened in the sense of being less competition 
oriented. 
Another important element in the design of merger control is the identity of the authority 
enforcing it. In most countries a competition (or antitrust) authority or a court are in charge 
of taking decisions on proposed mergers. In others, the decision-making power is shared 
among several authorities, such as multiple antitrust authorities or the ministry of finance. 
Again in other countries, ministries or special sector regulators, as is sometimes the case in 
the banking sector, enforce competition control. 
The strength of the enforcer depends also on whether another authority can intervene, 
take over the review process or overturn decisions. For example, in Germany the Ministry 
of Economics and Labor may, upon application, clear a concentration prohibited by the 
competition authority if the restraint of competition is outweighed by advantages to the 
economy as a whole or it is justified by an overriding public interest 
(“Ministerialerlaubnis”). In the US the review by the Federal Reserve or other competent 
regulator in the banking sector is followed by an independent review by the Department of 
Justice. In case of conflict the case is brought to court. 
A last important component of the design of the merger control is the procedure followed 
in the merger review. In most countries the competition control is mandatory, i.e., a merger 
must be notified to the competent authority if it is large enough. In others, notification is 
instead voluntary but the enforcing authority can undo mergers ex post if they turn out to 
create adverse competitive effects. After the notification process, it is decided whether the 
merger has the potential to raise competition concerns and, if this is the case, the specific  
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transaction is reviewed in more depth. At the end of this process, the enforcer decides to 
approve, block or impose remedies on the proposed merger. In the latter case, parties are 
required to divest part of their business in particularly concentrated geographical areas or 
lines of product. In all countries the evaluation and decision process tend to be highly 
transparent in that decisions must be motivated and are made public. 
The changes occurring in the competition control of M&As over the last three decades 
involved one or more of the dimensions of the control identified above. In most countries 
the control was introduced de novo (e.g., Italy, Netherlands, Denmark, Spain, Sweden), 
while in other instances it was modified in terms of a different enforcer (e.g., Ireland, 
Portugal) or a different notification procedure (e.g., Spain where notification became 
mandatory in 1999). All changes led to a more competition-oriented control of M&As. 
B.  An Example  
Before analyzing econometrically the effect of changes in competition control, we 
describe here the economic hypothesis underlying our exercise with the help of a simple 
numerical example. The main ingredients of this example come from the standard theory of 
industrial organization (Tirole [1988]). 
Consider an industry at time t=0 with 16 firms divided in 8 firms of type X and 8 firms of 
type Y. Each firm has an initial value of 100; and in each period nature decides which firms 
can acquire another firm and merge with it. For simplicity, let half of the X firms and half 
of the Y firms turn out to be “natural” acquirers. Assume also that only mergers among 
different types of firms create synergies (and in particular they double the value) so that, 
depending on the type of the acquirers, we have  ) ( 2 1 1 − − + = t t t Y X X  or  ) ( 2 1 1 − − + = t t t X Y Y  
and  1 1 − − + = t t t X X X  or  1 1 − − + = t t t Y Y Y .   
  11 
When there is no merger control, firms are free to merge and maximize their value. In 
each period the “natural” acquirers as selected by nature will each merge with a firm of the 
other type and will double their value. So, in t=1, each of the four “natural” X and Y 
acquirers will merge with a firm of the other type and each resulting firm will be worth 400. 
Repeating the same game in each period we obtain: 
Period  Mergers 
taking place 
Resulting 
Industry 
Resulting value 
per firm 
Resulting total 
industry value 
0    8 X, 8 Y  100  1,600 
1  4 (X + Y) 
4 (X + Y) 
4 X, 4 Y  400  3,200 
2  2 (X + Y) 
2 (Y + X) 
2 X, 2 Y  1,600  6,400 
3  X + Y 
Y + X 
X, Y  6,400  12,800 
4  X + Y or 
Y + X 
X or Y  25,600  25,600 
 
Let us now introduce competition control that, in order to avoid the creation of dominant 
positions, limits the market share of each firm to 25% and blocks any merger leading to a 
larger share.
4 Clearly the effect of this control on the valuation of firms will depend on the 
period in which it is introduced. Specifically, the earlier the control is introduced, the more 
it affects the structure of the industry and thus the more negative are its effects on the 
valuation of the firms and thus on investors’ reactions. For simplicity, suppose here that 
competition control is introduced at t=1. Then we have: 
                                                 
4 We assume the limit of 25% for simplicity as it reflects the threshold below which in many countries mergers 
are considered not to raise any competitive concerns and are reviewed according to a simplified procedure. 
The analysis does not change if we assume different thresholds.  
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Period  Mergers 
taking place 
Resulting 
Industry 
Resulting 
value per 
firm 
Resulting 
total 
industry 
value 
Expected 
value at t>4 
0    8 X, 8 Y  100  1,600  25,600 
1  4 (X + Y) 
4 (X + Y) 
4 X, 4 Y  400  3,200  6,400 
2  2 (X + Y) 
2 (Y + X) 
2 X, 2 Y  1,600  6,400  6,400 
3  All blocked  2 X, 2 Y  1,600  6,400  6,400 
4  All blocked  2 X, 2 Y  1,600  6,400  6,400 
 
The exercise shows clearly that the introduction of competition control reduces the future 
valuation of firms and worsens investors’ expectations. The negative effect of the 
competition control persists even when the control is introduced at a later date, even though 
it is reduced. Overall, the example shows that investors will react negatively to 
announcements of legislative changes leading to more competition-oriented control of 
M&As. We now test whether such a prediction finds support in our data. 
IV.  Data and Methodology 
We use an event study approach to analyze the effects of the introduction and 
strengthening of competition control (henceforth, “changes” in competition control) in 
numerous industrial countries over the last three decades.
5 In order to identify the events, 
we collect detailed information on the legislative changes affecting the setup for 
                                                 
5 The application and the interpretation of the results from an event study require the events to be exogenous. 
We conjecture that no sectors, and in particular banks, can decisively lobby and induce a change of 
competition control that is applicable to all sectors. We then check this conjecture. For example, the results we 
present later in the paper do not differ between countries with large versus small banking sectors (proxied by 
total bank credit / GDP with a cutoff of 150 %). The size of the banking sector may represent a possible 
measure of lobbying power. Of course the introduction of competition control could itself be driven by 
developments in the domestic or neighboring economies, and the timing of the introduction of competition 
policy may be determined by country size (Forslid, Hackner and Muren [2005]).  
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competition reviews of M&As in the European Union (EU) and 18 individual countries: the 
United States and Canada, 14 EU countries, including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom, and two non-EU countries, Switzerland and Norway.
6 We focus on the 
time period January 1, 1987 to July 1, 2004 during which most of the changes occurred. 
In the collection of the data, we relied on multiple sources. In a first step, we obtained 
and analyzed the exact text of all relevant legislation and regulation to identify the legal 
arrangements of the competition control in each country and the changes that took place 
over time. In a second step, we scrutinized the many publicly available reports on merger 
control to check our interpretation of the events (Appendix 1 contains a comprehensive 
list). Finally, we directly contacted experts of the various institutions dealing with merger 
control across all countries (Appendix 2 contains the list of agencies we contacted). We 
engaged these contacts, often in multiple and prolonged written and verbal 
communications, to confirm our understanding and “coding” of the data, to seek 
clarifications and corrections and to identify the most important aspects of merger control in 
practice. 
A.  Institutional Variables 
A key contribution of the paper is to aggregate the information we collected and to 
construct various indexes capturing the crucial dimensions of the competition control of 
M&As (and of the supervisory control in the banking sector, as we will describe in more 
                                                 
6 In European Union countries a two-layer regime is in place for the competition review of concentrations. All 
mergers with a ‘community dimension’ are examined by the European Commission, whereas transactions 
without ‘community dimension’ are left to the competent national authorities. The dividing line between the 
two cases is drawn on the basis of the size and geographical dispersion of turnovers. 
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detail below). Four dimensions (which we formulate as the answers to four questions) shape 
the merger policy regime of any country: 
￿  What assessment criteria are used in competition control? 
￿  Who is (are) the decision-making agency(ies) for competition control?  
￿  Can a third agency intervene in the process to replace / overturn the decision-
making agency(ies)? 
￿  Is merger notification mandatory above (statutory) thresholds? 
From these questions we construct the four variables labeled as Competition Criteria, 
Competition Enforcer, Competition Overturning, and Mandatory Notification respectively, 
which range between 0 and 1, with higher values corresponding to a more competition-
oriented design and implementation of the competition control. Our ranking of the answers 
reflects the simple idea that the merger review is more-competition oriented (at least from 
an ex ante perspective) when it has the single, narrower objective of preventing restrictions 
on competition, it is enforced by a single, independent agency, no other agency can 
intervene in the process, and notification is mandatory. 
B.  Events 
We report the coded answers to the questions at the beginning and at the end of our 
sample period in Table 1. The table shows the heterogeneity of the competition policy 
across the different countries and the substantial changes that occurred over time.
7 For 
                                                 
7 Competition control in banking was not introduced at the same time as in the other sectors in France, 
Netherlands and Portugal, but none of these cases turn out to be relevant for our analysis. In France the 
banking sector was perceived to be subject to the competition control of mergers and acquisitions according to 
the Competition Law of July 1977 until the Supreme Court stated on May 16, 2003 that the banking sector 
was not subject to any competition control (we return to this case later in the paper when we discuss the Crédit 
Agricole-Crédit Lyonnais episode). In the Netherlands, the Competition Act of May 22, 1997 did not apply to 
the banking sector (art. 32) but only temporarily for two years (art. 107.3). In Portugal merger control was 
introduced in all sectors except banking with the decree-law n. 428/88 of November 19, 1988. Bank mergers 
became subject to the control only with the law 18/2003 approved on April 10, 2003, which substantially  
  15 
example, in the period between 1987:01 and 2004:07 the EU introduced competition 
control that (1) employs only competition criteria, (2) is enforced by a single antitrust 
authority (the DG Competition of the European Commission), (3) can be overturned only ex 
post on a case-specific basis, and (4) is operating under mandatory notification. On the 
other hand the UK modified the competition-orientation of the merger control by 
introducing legislation that (1) removed other criteria in competition control and (2) shifted 
decision-making from the ministry to multiple antitrust agencies, but that also (3) made 
overturning possible. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
The changes in any of the four key institutional variables across the sample period define 
our set of events. Note, however, that for simplicity the table reports the answers to the 
questions only at the beginning and end of our time sample, thus under-representing the 
number of changes that occurred. 
C.  Dating 
The precise dating of the changes in competition laws regulating the control of mergers 
and acquisitions across the sample countries, combined with information on stock prices, 
constitutes the main ingredients of our empirical investigation. Figure 1 displays the main 
steps in most legislative procedures and the corresponding dates we use in our study.
8 
We divide the legislative process into three phases: approval, publication and 
implementation. Approval refers to the date of approval by either the Parliament or the 
                                                                                                                                                     
reformed the merger control also for all the other sectors after a new, independent authority was created. 
However, for lack of readily accessible stock market data we drop the 1988 event and include only the 2003 
sector-wide event. 
8 The legislative steps in Figure 1 reflect the general procedure. In practice the procedure may vary slightly 
across countries. For example, in some countries (such as Finland) the approval of the Head of State is not 
required. These differences do not affect our analysis.  
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Head of State. When available, we collect from our sources and contacts the earliest date in 
the official approval process. For example, in a bi-cameral parliamentary system we use the 
date when the first chamber approves the law. Publication refers to the date when the 
legislation is published in the country’s official journal; and Implementation is the official 
date when the legislation enters into force. The process leading up to implementation varies 
substantially across countries and type of legislation. In general, a law comes into force 
either after a certain (fixed) time period starting from the day when it is published or 
following a decree implementing it. In the latter case, the process may contain more 
uncertainty, as some aspects of the policy regime may be specified in the implementing 
decree only. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
To capture the earliest time when investors can reasonably be expected to infer changes 
in the legislation, we study the stock price reaction around the earliest official date that we 
collect.
9 We consolidate the dates in this way for obvious reasons. The process of legislative 
codification varies substantially across countries. In some countries the official date of a 
law is the approval date (typically the approval by the Head of State), in other countries it is 
actually the publication or even the implementation date. Neglecting these differences 
across countries entails the risk of analyzing investors’ reactions to widely divergent 
information sets. By focusing instead on the earliest official date with information context 
(i.e., often the approval in one of the chambers of the legislature), we try to harmonize the 
information investors have about the outcome of the legislative process across countries and 
                                                 
9 The precise dating in regulatory event studies of the change in the investors’ expectations is of paramount 
importance. But we estimate excess returns for multiple intervals and link the estimates to country and bank 
characteristics (as recommended in Binder [1985]).  
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thus minimize the risk of misinterpreting investors’ responses. Thus, we complement the 16 
approval dates with 4 publication dates to obtain 20 Event dates.
10 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 2 lists the 20 event dates and the exact changes in competition control that 
occurred in the sample period in the countries we analyze. The table shows that, in many 
instances, the new law strengthened several dimensions of merger control at once (an 
additional reason not to link the event selection criteria to the outcomes). The table also 
includes characteristics of the supervisory policy regime in place at the time of the changes 
in competition control. We will discuss the dimensions of supervisory merger control more 
in detail later in the paper. 
D.  Event Windows 
Once the event dates are selected, we analyze the impact of the changes on the event 
dates themselves as well as during an adequate period preceding them.
11 The reason for 
doing this is that most major legislation is typically prepared in parliamentary committees 
before it is brought to a chamber floor. Hence it is important to analyze also the period 
before the legislative changes as it captures the investors’ potential reaction to the entire 
political debate and process preceding and surrounding any important committee work 
(party manifestos, government agreements, public lobby group endorsements, etc.). 
Furthermore, as the process of codification unfolds differently in each country, we 
believe it is crucial to analyze the impact of the legislative changes also during the periods 
surrounding the other dates we identified in the legislative process. In particular, we analyze 
                                                 
10 There were no changes in competition control during the sample period and hence there are no events for 
Germany, Canada and the US. 
11 Short event windows limit the impact of confounding events and are conform to the presumption of market 
efficiency that is necessary to make the event study informative (McWilliams and Siegel [1997]).  
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the stock price reactions around the 20 implementation dates to capture investors’ possible 
reactions to “last-minute details” that are specified in the implementation process of the 
legislative changes (such as the precise mandates, chairmanship and membership of 
committees and institutions, operational regulations, etc.). 
E.  Event Study Methodology 
How do changes in laws governing competition policy affect the market valuations of 
both non-financial firms and banks? To answer this question we start by employing daily 
sector and total market price indices for the 18 countries and the EU-15 region and the 
Morgan Stanley All Country World Index from Datastream in the period January 1, 1987 to 
July 1, 2004. The bank indices have the Datastream code BANKSCC, where CC stands for 
the respective two-digit country code. The non-financial sector indices have the code 
TOTLICC. The total market indices are labeled TOTMKCC. The indices capture all listed 
firms in the respective category and are value-weighted. 
We estimate daily abnormal returns using standard market model regressions. We regress 
the daily returns for index j, rjt, on a measure of the market return, rmt, and two event 
dummies, 
before
t δ  and 
after
t δ , that take the value of one when day t is inside the event 
windows [-τ, 0] and [1, τ] respectively, and zero otherwise: 
jt
after
t
after
j
before
t
before
j mt j j jt r r ε δ γ δ γ β α + + + + = ,      (1) 
t = -250-τ, -249-τ, ..., 249+τ, 250+τ. 
Our two event windows contain between 5 and 241 trading days, i.e., we vary τ between 
2 and 120. The coefficients 
before
j γ  and 
after
j γ measure daily abnormal returns during the  
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event periods before and after the event. The market model is estimated over a period 
starting (-250-τ) days before the event and ending (250+τ) days after the event.
12 
For the results reported in the paper, we a priori choose to use the value-weighted index 
of all stocks in the country as a proxy for the market return, by itself or in combination with 
the EU-15 Market Index, and the Morgan Stanley All Country World Index. 
For each event the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are the estimated coefficients 
before
j γˆ  and 
after
j γˆ . For each event we estimate daily abnormal returns for both the domestic 
index of non-financial institutions (“firms”) and the domestic bank index (“banks”). We 
calculate the average and standard deviations of the CARs across the set of events and 
perform a standard t-test to assess statistical significance. We also report the number of 
positives and negatives and perform a standard sign test. 
We further assess the difference between the CARs of both indices by performing a t-test 
assuming unequal variances and a sign test based on the number of differences that are 
positives or negatives. Finally, we perform the more general Fisher’s exact probability test 
of independence to detect differences between firms and banks in the signs of their reaction. 
This non-parametric test should alleviate any lingering concerns about event or country 
heterogeneity. 
To address the potential concern of the independence of the events, we employ a 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Goodness-of-Fit test.
13 After doing this we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the exact event dates (reported later) are uniformly distributed across the 
entire sample period (or for the EU countries across the period starting on December 21, 
                                                 
12 We a priori choose for a long estimation window around the event, as we are concerned about the impact of 
the changes in regulation on market risk (Grout and Zalewska [2006]). We check the robustness of the results 
to alternative estimation windows, the (-250-τ, τ) window for example, and time-varying market betas.  
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1989, the approval date for EU competition legislation).
 We also regress the CARs on 
various specifications including a time trend, and again we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that the coefficients on the trend variables are equal to zero. To conclude, events seem 
independent. 
V. The Impact of Changes in Competition Control 
A.  Main Results 
The results of the event study for the stock indexes of firms and banks averaged across 
events are reported in Table 3. For brevity, we report only various windows within the 
interval [-120,120] around the legislative changes as identified by the event and 
implementation dates. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Most of the statistically significant results lie in the windows before and including the 
event date. This should not come as a surprise given our dating strategy. As described 
before, we select the earliest available date of the legislative process as the event date and 
therefore the most significant reaction is expected to occur immediately before and on this 
date. Put differently, the fact that investors appear to react most strongly in these windows 
confirms the accurateness of our dating strategy. 
There are sporadically some significant reactions in the windows preceding and including 
the implementation date, although much less than for the event dates. This can also be 
easily understood since, as already mentioned, the implementation date removes in some 
cases the remaining doubts about the introduction and actual modus operandi of the new 
                                                                                                                                                     
13 See NIST/SEMATECH [2006] for example for details on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Goodness-of-Fit test 
and Preacher and Briggs [2001] for details on the Fisher’s exact probability test of independence.  
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piece of legislation. Overall, these results highlight that investors anticipate and react 
immediately to the outcomes of the legislative changes and no further effects are left in the 
windows after either the event or the implementation dates. 
Moving to the analysis of the results, we see that changes in competition control have 
important economic effects for both the real and the banking sector. Changes in competition 
control lead on average to a decrease in non-financial firms’ stock prices but to an increase 
in banks’ stock prices. The negative effect on firms is in line with our predictions as 
described in Section III.B, but the positive effect on banks is somewhat surprising. 
The difference between the reactions of banks and firms is positive and highly 
statistically significant (we report significance levels for both standard t-tests and sign 
tests). The difference is also economically relevant, reaching the value of 1.1%*, 3.3%**, 
7.6%*** and 11.1%*, respectively for the 2, 20, 60 and 120 day windows before and 
including the event date. Both the sign test on the differences and the more general Fisher’s 
test of independence indicate that firms and banks’ stocks differ in the direction of their 
reaction. 
B.  By Country 
To further analyze the effects of changes in competition control, we report the results by 
event for each country in Table 4 for the 2, 20 and 60-day windows before and including 
the event date.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
As the sign tests already indicated, almost all events lead to a decrease in firms’ stock 
prices and to an increase in banks’ stock prices.
14 Concerning banks, we notice a negative 
                                                 
14 The publication of the law strengthening merger control in Austria on January 1, 1993, coincides with the 
widely anticipated formal dissolution of neighboring Czechoslovakia. While the observed three-day CARs are  
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effect of the changes in competition policy only for the European Union, the Netherlands 
and Sweden. 
Possible explanations for these cases can be found in some specific features of each of 
these “countries”. The negative effect for the European Union may be attributed to the 
possibility for Member States to contrast the power of the European Commission and 
pursue objectives other than competition by using prudential rules as legitimate interests 
(art. 21(3) of the Council Regulation N. 4064/89 and subsequent modifications). Attempts 
to use this provision to block foreign takeovers can be found in the well-known cases of 
Champalimaud-Santander in 1999, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro-BBVA (Banco de Bilbao 
Vizcaya Argentaria) and ABN AMRO-Antonveneta in 2005, and HVB-Unicredito in 2005. 
The negative reaction of banks’ stock prices in the Netherlands may be due to the 
(possibly unexpected) delay of two years in the introduction of merger control in the 
banking sector relative to the other sectors (art. 32 and 108.3 of the Competition Act 
approved in date March 20, 1997). The delay prolonged the influence of the Minister of 
Finance on the concentration of economic power in the banking sector according to the Act 
on the Supervision of the Credit System of 1992 until January 2000. 
Finally, the negative response of banks’ stock prices in Sweden may simply reflect the 
investors’ anticipation of a strict application of competition policy given the highly 
oligopolistic structure of the Sweden banking sector. In line with this conjecture, it is worth 
recalling the withdrawal of the proposed merger between SE Banken and 
FöreningsSparbanken in 2001 after the numerous objections raised by the European 
Commission. Also, we note that the supervisory control of M&As in Sweden is transparent 
                                                                                                                                                     
large, the returns in the other windows don’t seem unusual. Removing this event hardly affects the median of 
the three-day CARs or any other result.  
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in that decisions are public. This leaves little scope for a potential positive externality 
between competition and supervision in banking (as developed further in the paper) and 
thus for an increase in banks’ stock prices. In this respect, it is also curious to note an 
insignificant effect of the events also in other countries, like Finland and Norway, similarly 
characterized by a relatively transparent supervisory policy regime. 
C.  Robustness 
Before trying to explain the different impact of the introduction and strengthening in 
competition control on firm and bank stocks, we subject our findings to a variety of 
robustness checks. We report the key results in the lower three panels of Table 3. We first 
report results using (1) the value-weighted index of all stocks in the country in combination 
with the EU-15 Market Index, and (2) the Morgan Stanley All Country World Index as 
proxies for the market return. Results are almost unaffected. 
We also conduct the event study using reasonable combinations of the domestic, EU-15, 
and world indices with the MS All Country Non Financial Index and the MS All Country 
Bank Index. Results are again almost unaffected and we choose not to report them. We 
further alter our estimation windows. In particular we estimate the beta coefficients using 
only pre-event stock returns. Again, results are unaffected and we choose not to report these 
findings. 
Finally, we perform again the exercise using individual bank stocks rather than indexes 
(we return to using individual bank stocks in Section V), although we initially chose the 
latter for reasons of coverage, selection, and relevant value weighting. We again estimate a 
market model employing the value-weighted index of all stocks in the country as a proxy 
for the market return. Averaging across the banks within each country and then across the  
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events or averaging immediately across the 323 individual bank stocks, we obtain average 
CARs that are broadly similar to our earlier results. 
To summarize, firms’ stock prices decrease and banks’ stocks increase in anticipation 
and upon the approval of changes strengthening competition control. The reaction of firms 
is in line with the idea that competition control, if stringent, imposes limits on the market 
power of companies involved in mergers and thus on their market values. The reaction of 
banks is instead surprising and deserves further exploration. Before doing that though, we 
look for further evidence supporting the positive results on banks’ stock prices. In 
particular, we first analyze two widely publicized bank merger episodes that led to 
clarifications or changes of existing legislation; and then study the characteristics of the 
mergers that took place before and after the implementation of the changes in competition 
control. 
D.  Two Case Studies 
1.  France March 2003: Crédit Agricole-Crédit Lyonnais 
When Crédit Agricole made a takeover bid for the ailing former state bank Crédit 
Lyonnais in December 2002, the French banking landscape – as became clear later – was 
characterized by some ambiguity concerning the implementation of the competition control 
in this sector and the identity of the authority enforcing it. The belief was that the Comité 
des Etablissements de Credit et des Enterprises d’Investissement (CECEI) – the supervisory 
authority in charge of licensing banks – was in charge of reviewing bank mergers both from 
a competition and a supervisory perspective. In line with this, the CECEI reviewed the 
proposed merger between Crédit Agricole and Crédit Lyonnais and approved it in March 
2003 conditional on a number of remedies. In particular, the parties were required to divest 
85 out of 9,275 branches and “freeze” the others in order to avoid the creation of dominant  
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positions in a number of local retail markets. The decision led to some concerns related to 
the loss of employment and induced a union (the Fédération des employés et cadres) and 
two employees to challenge it in front of the Conseil de l’Etat, the French supreme court for 
administrative justice. On May 16, 2003, the Conseil de l’Etat declared the conditions 
imposed for competition reasons invalid but not the decision to approve the transaction 
(from a supervisory perspective) on the basis that the CECEI was not legally in charge of 
the competition control of bank mergers. 
This ruling implied an unexpected weakening of competition control in the banking 
sector and led to its substantial reform in August 2003. Given the extraordinary and judicial 
character of this case, we choose not to include it in our original set of events but rather to 
check its consistency relative to the previous results. Specifically, we perform an event 
study around the date of the ruling of the Conseil de l’Etat to see whether banks’ stock 
prices react in line with our previous findings. Given this event entails a weakening of the 
competition control in banking, we expect a negative effect on banks’ stock prices. The 
results of this event study are reported at the bottom of Table 3. Consistent with our 
predictions, the 3-day bank CARs in the interval [-2,0] equal -0.77***. In the windows 
following the event bank CARs are negative, economically relevant, although never more 
than marginally significant. 
2.  Italy 2005: ABN AMRO-Antonveneta 
Our second case attracted even greater international attention. At the beginning of 2005 
the Dutch bank ABN AMRO made a takeover bid for the Italian banks Banca Antoniana 
Popolare Veneta (Antonveneta). As a response, a domestic bank, Banca Popolare Italiana 
(BPI, formerly Banca Popolare di Lodi), made a counter-bid thus triggering a takeover 
battle for the control of Antonveneta (henceforth, Antonveneta case). The takeover was  
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subject to the competition control of the European Commission and the supervisory control 
of the Bank of Italy. It was widely perceived that the Italian supervisory authority did not 
take a fully impartial attitude between the foreign and domestic bidders, supposedly for 
prudential reasons. The battle attracted media attention, it involved many political and 
regulatory bodies, and led to important legislative changes concerning the organization of 
the Bank of Italy as well as the control of bank M&As in Italy. 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
For this reason, we choose to analyze the Antonveneta case as a further example 
illustrating the reaction of banks’ stock prices in anticipation of legislative changes. Figure 
2 focuses on the events related to the takeover battle and plots the cumulative abnormal 
returns on the Italian bank stock index in the year 2005. The vertical arrows in the figure 
point to key dates representing crucial events during this period. The first relevant date is 
February 8, 2005, when the EU Commissioner for the Internal Market, Mr. Charlie 
McCreevy, publicly warned the Governor of the Bank of Italy, Mr. Antonio Fazio, not to 
block foreign bank takeovers. Following this warning, the Italian bank stock index started a 
remarkable trend upwards possibly reflecting the expectations among investors of the 
eventual passage of a law (that had been idling in Parliament for a long time already) that 
would reform, inter alia, the control of M&As. 
The increase in banks’ excess returns came to a halt in mid 2005 but it resumed steadily 
in September 2005 after the Italian Prime Minister, Mr. Silvio Berlusconi, criticized 
officially the handling of the takeover case by the Bank of Italy and asked the resignation of 
its governor. The run-up of banks’ stock prices terminated with the resignation of Mr Fazio 
on December 19
th and the passage two days later of the law that transferred the  
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responsibility for competition reviews of bank mergers from the supervisor to the Italian 
antitrust authority. 
The visual impression of the Italian bank stock prices reacting to the identified events is 
broadly corroborated by the stylized event study reported in the table at the bottom of 
Figure 2 (Appendix 3 provides more details on the key events). We regress daily bank stock 
index returns on a constant, daily national market index returns, and event period dummies. 
The estimation period starts on March 16, 2002, and ends on March 15, 2006. 
As the event study shows, banks’ stock prices reacted positively during the takeover 
battle after the Commissioner’s call in early February 2005, which presumably represented 
a signal for investors of a future change in the supervisory control in Italy. Such a change 
was effectively implemented in December 2005, and in anticipation of this, the increase in 
banks’ stock prices became more pronounced. 
In sum, the Antonveneta case provides further support to the results of the event study 
conducted in Section V.A. Differently from non-financial firms, banks react positively to 
legislative changes – or news about them – that make the control of M&As more-
competition oriented. Also, the Antonveneta case clearly underlines the importance of 
competition control and sector specific regulation. The belief that the Bank of Italy was 
driven by objectives other than prudential considerations in handling the case and the 
numerous attempts to remove potential inefficiencies and favoritisms led investors to think 
that the potential, future legislative changes would increase the value of listed Italian banks. 
E.  Mergers Before and After the Changes in Competition Control 
We now turn to the study of a comprehensive merger date set to analyze whether the 
changes in competition control affected the characteristics of the actual M&A transactions 
and the bank stock prices around their announcements. We start from SDC Platinum data  
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and complement it with additional records of bank M&As obtained from competition and 
supervisory authorities in the sample countries. This allows us to increase the number of 
bank mergers by more than 10% thus reaching a data set containing 15,148 bank M&A 
records and 101,441 firm M&A records for the sample countries during the period January 
1, 1990 to June 1, 2004. 
We study M&A characteristics and stock prices 250, 750 and 1,500 days before and after 
the implementation dates. We test the differences between the period before and after for 
the group of banks and firms, respectively. We then investigate the “differences-in-these-
differences” between the banks and the firms. To control for country specific time trends, 
we assess the statistical significance of all differences by comparing their actual values with 
a distribution drawn randomly with replacement within the sample period (100 draws). 
The results (which are available upon request) show that while the characteristics of 
M&As among firms are not altered much after changes in competition control, the 
characteristics of banks engaging in M&As differ substantially. The number of recorded 
bank mergers decreases, but bank targets more than double in terms of common equity or 
total assets and more than triple in terms of net income. Not surprisingly, the value of the 
transaction in bank M&As also doubles, but the percentage of the shares that is acquired, 
the percentage shares owned after the deal, and other standard deal characteristics seem 
mostly unaffected. Furthermore, bank target excess returns around the merger 
announcements increase by more than 10% after the implementation of changes in 
competition control relative to before the changes.  
Taken together, these results suggest that the introduction and the strengthening of 
competition control “encourages” bank M&As with larger and more profitable target banks, 
while leaving firm M&As mostly unaffected. How can we reconcile the increase in bank  
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target size in the years around the implementation of changes in competition control with 
our main results of positive bank excess returns in the days preceding and upon their 
approval? 
As is known from the literature (see Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford [2001]), target 
excess returns around the announcement are typically positive, statistically significant and 
as high as 30%, but lower for larger deal sizes. Thus, the positive reactions of investors 
before and upon the changes of competition control that we find in our analysis must be 
mostly driven by factors other than the simple increase in target size. Our conjecture is that 
the introduction of competition control, when non-binding, increases the likelihood that 
banks of high profitability become potential targets. Investors anticipate the future higher 
valuation of banks and react positively to legislative changes implementing more 
competition- and hence efficiency-oriented control of M&As. This is in line with existing 
results that anticipated components of returns around policy changes may be substantial 
(see Becher [2006] for example); and also with the result of larger bank target excess 
returns around the announcements of actual mergers, although the small number of 
observation prevents us from drawing strong conclusions. 
VI.  Explaining the Effect on Bank Stocks 
We now turn to explaining the differential effects between firms and banks in terms of 
both the results of the event study and the changes in the type of M&As before and after the 
regulatory amendments. Why do banks react differently? What are the factors pushing up 
their stock prices? As is in the other sectors, the introduction of competition control in the 
banking sector should prevent excessive market power, thus reducing future monopoly 
profits and stock prices. Why don’t we see this reflected in bank investors’ reactions? And 
why do bank targets grow in size and profitability?  
  30 
To tackle these questions, we regress individual bank CARs on a number of variables 
capturing important institutional aspects of the competition control in general, the 
supervisory control specific to the banking sector, country institutional quality and 
individual bank characteristics. Before reporting the results, we discuss below our economic 
hypotheses and the variables we use to test them. Table 5 provides an overview and the 
summary statistics of all the variables in the cross sectional exercise. 
A.  Supervisory Control of M&As in the Banking Sector 
As already mentioned, a crucial difference between the banking sector and most other 
sectors is that banks are subject to specific regulation and supervision.
 This includes special 
supervisory reviews of bank mergers to ensure the soundness and stability of the new 
entities. The Second Banking Directive in the European Union for example states that 
national bank supervisors “shall refuse authorization (of mergers; insertion by the authors) 
if, taking into account the need to ensure the sound and prudent management of a credit 
institution, they are not satisfied as to the suitability of the … shareholders” 
(European_Council [1989], article 5). The US Bank Merger Act stipulates that “In every 
case, the responsible agency shall take into consideration the financial and managerial 
resources and future prospects of the existing and proposed institutions, and the 
convenience and needs of the community to be served” (§128; see also the Bank Holding 
Company Act, §1842). The Federal Reserve Board considers particularly capital adequacy, 
but also asset quality, earnings performance and other aspects under this provision.
15 
                                                 
15 More generally, the Core Principles 4 and 5 for Effective Banking Supervision issued by the 
Basel_Committee_on_Banking_Supervision [1997] state that supervisors must have the authority to review 
and reject any changes in bank ownership or to establish criteria for reviewing major acquisitions or 
investments by a bank. The principles refer to the requirement that “banking supervisors have the authority to 
establish criteria for … ensuring that corporate affiliations or structures do not expose the bank to undue risks 
or hinder effective supervision”. Factors that are considered include ownership structures, operating plan,  
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Looking at our sample countries, we notice that these reviews were already in place in 
most instances at the time of the introduction or strengthening of the competition control. 
This brings in the possibility of a different reaction of banks’ investors as it may introduce a 
sort of “dialectics” between the two controls which is absent in other, non regulated sectors 
(see also Carlton and Picker [2006]). 
To investigate whether the presence of the supervisory control of bank mergers 
contributes explaining the banks’ different response to changes in competition control, we 
first document the institutional features of this control and then analyze their impact on 
banks’ stock prices. Following the same structure as for the competition control in Section 
III, we describe the institutional features of the supervisory control according to the 
objectives and criteria applied, the authorities in charge and the modality of the review 
process. 
The first aspect is captured by a variable denoted as Supervisory Criteria, which indicates 
whether the supervisory control focuses entirely on prudential and stability considerations 
or whether it follows also other criteria, such as for example the “convenience and needs of 
the community to be served” in the US.  
The second feature of the supervisory control is covered by the variable Supervisory 
Enforcer. This variable takes on the value of one when a separate, independent supervisory 
authority enforces the supervisory control. Lower values indicate that an authority that is 
less focused on stability and prudential concerns or less independent is in charge of the 
control. Note also that the power and the decision making process of the supervisory 
enforcer may be altered by capture or political influence. For example, banks may try and 
                                                                                                                                                     
systems of control and internal organization, fit and proper tests of directors and senior managers, and 
financial projections including capital. Overall, practice has however shown that the room for interpretation of 
the criteria and factors to be considered in the supervisory review can be very wide.  
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affect the outcome of the supervisory review by capturing the regulator; or politicians may 
lever control over the supervisory process by directing credit to pet projects for example. To 
check this, we will replace the Supervisory Enforcer variable in the robustness tests with 
proxies for the Supervisory Independence from Banks and from Politicians respectively, 
using measures gleaned from Barth, Caprio and Levine [2006]. 
Finally, concerning the process in which supervisory reviews are conducted, we note that 
this does not differ significantly across countries in terms of procedure. All mergers and all 
acquisitions entailing a “qualifying” percentage of shares (see art. 16 of the Second Banking 
Directive, EC, 1989, for example) must be notified to the competent authority and need to 
be approved. Differently from the competition control though, the notification procedure 
and the transparency of the review process differ significantly across countries. 
To capture this cross sectional variation, we construct two variables that may be relevant 
for investors’ assessment. The first variable, Supervisory Formal Decisions Not Public, 
represents the degree of transparency of the supervisory final decisions and it can thus be 
seen as a proxy of the potential discretion that can be used in the supervisory process. The 
variable equals one when decisions are not made public and zero if decisions are fully 
transparent. 
Looking at our sample countries, we note the high variability of this variable, as 
supervisory decisions are public only in a few countries (Finland, Norway, Sweden, the US, 
and to some extent in Canada and the UK, in which cases we give intermediate values). The 
idea is that if the supervisory decisions are public, there is less room for discretion and 
abuses in the supervisory process. Important examples of these potential distortions are the 
political interventions that happened around the above mentioned merger proposal of 
Champalimaud by Santander in 1999 and the takeover of Antonventa by ABN AMRO in  
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2005. In both cases, the supervisors were perceived to pursue objectives other than 
soundness and stability in an attempt to protect the national banking systems from foreign 
penetration. This attitude was certainly facilitated by the opaqueness of the decisions, which 
allowed the supervisory enforcers not to have to publicly motivate their actions.  
The second process variable we construct, Supervisory Informal Notification, refers to 
the requirement prescribed in the regulation (e.g., in UK) or imposed de facto (e.g., in 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden) that parties planning to merge have to informally notify the 
supervisor enforcer of their intentions before starting the formal procedure. This variable 
captures the possibility for the supervisory control to precede (and thus prevent) the 
competition control. In this sense, also this variable is a proxy for the discretion that can be 
used in the supervisory process. To the extent that mergers can be blocked or at least 
discouraged during this phase, this variable indicates the potential for the supervisory 
control to have exclusive power over bank merger decisions. 
Table 2 lists the level of the supervisory control that was in place in each country at the 
time of the changes in competition control. We note two features. First, as already 
mentioned, the table shows that the supervisory control preceded the competition control in 
most countries. Second, the table distinguishes between mergers and acquisitions for the 
variables Supervisory Criteria and Supervisory Enforcer. This is because in some cases the 
supervisory control differs in these two dimensions between mergers and acquisitions. 
While we document these differences here, we average across the two areas of control in 
the construction of the supervisory variables to keep the specifications parsimonious. 
B.  An Example  
To understand the contribution of the supervisory control of M&As in explaining the 
different reaction of bank investors to changes in competition control, we now return to our  
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example as described in Section III.B. Consider again the economy with 16 initial firms 
(which are now banks) of two different types, X and Y, and each with a value of 100. As 
before, nature selects the “natural” acquirers in each period and mergers take place. Mergers 
across types entail synergies while mergers within the same type of banks do not deliver 
any. 
Mergers are now regulated by a supervisor who prefers banks to merge within the same 
type rather than across different types. The reasons behind this preference can be various. 
Supervisors concerned about stability may for example dislike mergers among different 
types of banks as they may create complex organizations with risks that are more difficult to 
manage (offsetting any potential effects of diversification) and supervise. Alternatively, the 
preference for mergers of the same type may reflect the policy, often observed in cross 
border mergers, that supervisors prefer domestic acquirers over foreign ones even though 
the former may not be the “best” acquirers. Finally, the supervisor may be “captured” by 
domestic banks and thus enjoy some form of private benefits from allowing mergers among 
the same types of banks. 
Whatever the reason behind the supervisory policy, the result is that mergers among 
efficient banks may now not take place. To capture this in a simple way, we assume that 
only mergers among the same type of banks can occur when there is a supervisory control. 
Redoing the same exercise as in Section III.B, we obtain the following:   
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Period  Mergers 
taking place 
Resulting 
Industry 
Resulting value 
per firm 
Resulting total 
industry value 
0    8 X, 8 Y  100  1,600 
1  4 (X + X) 
4 (Y + Y) 
4 X, 4 Y  200  1,600 
2  2 (X + X) 
2 (Y + Y) 
2 X, 2 Y  400  1,600 
3  X + X 
Y + Y 
X, Y  800  1,600 
4  All blocked  X, Y  800  1,600 
 
This numerical example clearly shows how the presence of a supervisory control may put 
limits to the growth and market value of banks relative to a “free” market industry.  
Let us now introduce the competition control of M&As that, as before, limits the growth 
of banks and blocks all mergers entailing a market share larger than 25% irrespective of the 
type of the parties. How does this influence the functioning and the structure of the merger 
process? The answer crucially depends on the interaction between the two policies. For 
simplicity, we assume that the introduction of competition control removes the imposition 
by the supervisor to allow only mergers of an equal type. That is, we consider that once the 
competition control is introduced the merger process in the industry follows the same 
pattern as described in Section III.B. This simplifies our exercise without altering the 
qualitative results, as we discuss further below. Given this simplification, we then have: 
Period  Mergers 
taking place 
Resulting 
Industry 
Resulting 
value per 
firm 
Resulting 
total 
industry 
value 
Expected 
value at t>4 
(after intro) 
 
0    8 X, 8 Y  100  1,600  1,600 
1  4 (X + Y) 
4 (X + Y) 
4 X, 4 Y  400  3,200  6,400 
2  2 (X + Y) 
2 (Y + X) 
2 X, 2 Y  1,600  6,400  6,400 
3  All blocked  2 X, 2 Y  1,600  6,400  6,400 
4  All blocked  2 X, 2 Y  1,600  6,400  6,400 
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As one can immediately see, the introduction of competition control improves the growth 
and market value of the banking industry relative to the situation where only the 
supervisory control is in place. The result hinges on the assumption that the competition 
control removes the “inefficiencies” of the supervisory control by allowing mergers across 
banks of different types; but it persists even if we relax this. 
What matters is that the introduction of competition control entails another objective in 
the review of bank mergers and becomes more oriented to efficiency and market values 
than the existing supervisory control. When this is the case, the introduction (or 
strengthening) of competition control may positively affect the dynamics of the banking 
industry by promoting more efficient mergers and limiting the potential discretion or 
stability-oriented focus of the supervisory control. A clear example of this can be found in 
the already mentioned Champalimaud-Santander case, in which the European Commission 
convinced the Portuguese authorities to amend their initial leaning towards blocking the 
deal, thus succeeding in reversing this likely outcome. 
To sum up, our simple example shows that the introduction of competition control may 
involve a positive externality by leading to a very different dynamics in terms of market 
structure and market values in a regulated sector (like the banking industry) relative to an 
unregulated sector. In particular, the example suggests that the competition control may 
lead to higher bank values and thus may trigger a positive response by bank investors 
relative to investors in other sectors. 
Despite its stylized character, we can use the example to formulate economic hypotheses 
on the role of the four institutional variables describing the supervisory control that we have 
introduced earlier. Concerning the variables Supervisory Criteria and Supervisory Enforcer, 
the example suggests that a stronger focus on stability or a more stability-oriented enforcer  
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should lead to more positive bank CARs preceding and upon changes in the competition 
control of bank mergers. To the extent that pursuing the objective of stability more strictly 
entails larger costs in terms of foregone efficiencies, the future valuation of banks and thus 
investors’ expectations should be more positive. In a similar spirit, higher values of the 
variables Supervisory Formal Decisions Not Public and Supervisory Informal Notification 
should lead to more positive bank CARs in expectation of changes in the competition 
control of bank mergers. The idea is that opaque procedures as well as informal power 
increase the potential for discretion and distortions in the supervisory review of bank 
mergers, thus improving investors’ expectations of the positive effect of changes in 
competition control.  
To conclude, all the considerations above suggest that the stock prices of banks should 
increase at the announcement of changes in the competition policy when the supervisory 
controls are important in the merger decisions. Competition policy by acting as “a-
constraint-on-a-constraint” relaxes the latter constraint. The more independent and focused 
on stability the supervisory review and the less transparent and the more informal the 
supervisory process – allowing for the improper invocation of national interest clauses or an 
erratic implementation for example – the more positive should therefore be the increase in 
banks’ stock prices. 
C.  Other Institutional Characteristics 
Before testing the predictions related to the presence of the supervisory control of bank 
mergers, we describe below other variables, which we use in the cross-sectional analysis to 
capture other potential explanations for the positive reaction of banks CARs in our event 
study. In particular, we investigate some institutional characteristics of the competition  
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control that could play a special role in the banking sector as well as some bank 
characteristics. 
1.  Efficiency Defense 
As already mentioned in Section III.A, in some countries efficiencies are explicitly taken 
into account in the competition review of mergers. When this is the case, the competition 
control is somewhat less stringent, as efficiencies represent an attenuating factor to the 
increase in market power. To the extent that banks can claim more than non-financial firms 
that the merger leads to important efficiency gains (through the presence of economies of 
scale for example or because of improper implementation), they may be subject to a less 
stringent competition control than other industries and thus benefit more (or be hurt less) 
from the introduction of competition control. 
To control for this, we construct the variable Efficiency Defense that equals one if 
efficiency gains are being explicitly considered in the merger review as a factor mitigating 
anticompetitive effects, and equals zero otherwise.
16 We include the change in this variable 
(∆) as a result of the strengthening in competition policy. The hypothesis is that of a 
positive correlation between this variable and the bank CARs. Also, we interact ∆Efficiency 
Defense with log(Bank Assets), a measure of bank size, to analyze whether larger banks 
benefit more from a more efficiency-oriented review. 
2.  National Markets 
The introduction or the strengthening of competition policy should sustain and intensify 
competition. On the other hand, some observers claim that competition policy could 
                                                 
16 This variable captures only the situation where the efficiency defense is explicitly incorporated in the 
merger regulation. The case where the efficiency defense is only implicitly and informally used (as 
documented so far only for the US by DeYoung [1991]) is not captured by our variable.  
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sometimes act as a collusion-enhancing device, in particular in an oligopolistic sector. If 
competition control prevents external growth for the few large banks operating in the 
market, its introduction or strengthening may sustain more easily collusive behavior, and 
hence, consistently with investors’ expectations, may result in higher future profits. 
To capture this effect, we interact ∆National Markets and C3. The variable National 
Markets refers to the geographical definition of the markets used in the competition reviews 
of bank mergers in the various countries (∆ again stands for the change in this definition as 
a result of the change in competition control); while the variable C3 is a simple measure of 
the level of concentration in the banking sector. Taken together, these two variables are 
indicative of the stringency of merger control (expected negative sign) or of the potential 
for collusive agreements (expected positive sign). 
3.  Corruption and Regional Effects 
An important issue is also whether the positive bank CARs may be driven by the general 
quality of governmental and regulatory institutions rather than by institutional features 
specific to the competition and supervisory policies. In order to check whether our 
institutional variables just pick up this more general institutional quality, we introduce 
proxies for the latter. This is the variable Corruption that accounts for the degree to which 
bribes, nepotism and ties between politics and business are prevalent in a given country and 
a variable Bureaucratic Quality that accounts for the strength and expertise of the national 
bureaucracy.  
  40 
We further include regional random effects to control for economic and financial 
development,
17 including for example past growth in productivity in the financial services’ 
sector. 
D.  Bank Characteristics 
Certain bank characteristics may also contribute determining excess returns. One of the 
most obvious is bank size. Consider for example bank mergers that are driven by 
managerial hubris rather than by value enhancing considerations (Berger, Dick, Goldberg 
and White [2007]). In such cases, investors at the largest banks should benefit most from 
the tightening of the competition control, as these banks are most likely to be limited in 
their merger plans. Opaque and small banks may gain most if the strengthening of 
competition control would actually intensify and increase the quality of the “supervisory 
auditing” of consolidating banks. Finally, stocks of medium-sized banks may gain most if 
investors expect these banks to be more likely targets in domestic or cross border 
transactions as the strengthened competition control may block any future mergers between 
large banks. 
To control for all these possibilities, we include the log of Bank Assets in level and 
squared in all specifications. We also interact bank size with some characteristics of the 
supervisory control in the robustness checks to confirm the precise source of the bank stock 
gains. 
Banks could further benefit indirectly from the introduction or the strengthening of 
merger control in the other, non-financial sectors. For example, if merger control imposes 
                                                 
17 Too few banks are listed in some countries to include a complete set of country effects. Regions include 
Scandinavia, the British Isles, Western Europe, Iberia and Southern Europe. Hausman-tests consistently 
indicate random effects are to be preferred. Results for fixed effects model are very similar and we report their 
adjusted R-squared statistics.  
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“binding” limits to firms’ external growth, firms are obliged to expand through greenfield 
investments rather than through M&As. To the extent that this leads to greater leverage for 
firms and thus more borrowing, banks could benefit in terms of higher profits from interest 
income. Alternatively, firms may need advice and expertise to comply with the new set up 
of the merger control. To the extent that banks provide this service, they could benefit in 
terms of higher fees. We control for these two possibilities by including the variables % 
Interest Income/Assets and % ROA interacting them with log(Bank Assets) as a measure of 
bank size in some specifications. 
E.  Results 
Table 6 reports the results of the various specifications. It is immediately clear that the 
variable Supervisory Formal Decisions Not Public plays a key role in explaining the excess 
returns on individual bank stocks. The coefficient on this variable in Model V for example 
suggests that the introduction of competition control in a country where supervisory formal 
decisions are not public results in an excess return on individual bank stocks that is one and 
a half percent larger than the excess return in a country where the formal decisions are 
public (= (1 – 1/2) * 3.80). The effect of the opaqueness of supervisory decisions is not to 
be attributed to the general institutional quality, since we control for Corruption for 
example, and its coefficient turns out not to be significant. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
The other variable which is significant in most specifications is National Markets * C3. 
However, in contrast with our prediction, its coefficient has a fairly consistent negative sign 
and magnitude. Thus, the collusion hypothesis is strongly rejected. In contrast, the negative 
sign of this coefficient suggests that the “standard” negative effect of changes in 
competition control prevails. Bank CARs are more negative (or less positive) when the  
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control is introduced in more concentrated markets as it is more expected to be binding and 
block further future concentration.  
None of the coefficients on the other variables turns out to be statistically significant and 
economically relevant, except for the coefficients on Supervisory Criteria and Supervisory 
Enforcer which are positive and significant but only in models I and II. The sign of both of 
these coefficients is in line with our predictions that bank CARs respond more positively to 
changes in competition control when the supervisory control is more stability oriented or is 
implemented by a separate, independent supervisor. However, given the weak significance 
of these coefficients, we prefer not to draw any strong conclusions. 
The strong performance of the variable Supervisory Decisions Not Public is consistent 
with the main hypothesis put forward above. The introduction or strengthening of the 
competition reviews of mergers seems to exert a positive externality in the financial system. 
This externality is stronger the more opaque the supervisory reviews are. The underlying 
idea is that the competition control limits somehow the working of the supervisory control 
by introducing more transparency in the review of bank mergers. This has the potential to 
limit the discretion with which the opaqueness of supervisory reviews can be used to pursue 
actions that hinder foreign entry or the efficient restructuring of the banking sector. 
F.  Robustness 
In Model VI we introduce Bureaucracy Quality as an additional country control. The 
coefficient on this variable turns out not to be significant and results are further unaffected. 
We also include the variables % Interest Income/Assets and % ROA interacting them with 
log(Bank Assets) as a measure of bank size in Models VII and VIII (employing a reduced 
sample). The coefficient on Supervisory Formal Decisions Not Public increases somewhat 
in size but otherwise results are unaffected.  
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The basic findings also hold when Supervisory Formal Decisions Not Public is interacted 
with the log of bank assets and after including all the control variables introduced before 
(we do not tabulate these results). Stocks of medium-sized banks almost always gain the 
most ground upon the changes in competition policy, presumably because, as already 
indicated, investors expect these banks to be the most likely targets that are still acceptable 
to the newly introduced or strengthened antitrust enforcer in banking. 
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
In Table 7 we subject our results to a number of other straightforward robustness checks. 
In Models I and II for example we replace our Supervisory Enforcer measure by proxies for 
the Supervisory Independence from Banks and from Politicians respectively. However, the 
coefficients on these measures are not significant and results are further unaffected. 
The results for a wider 21-day event window reported in Models III to VI, though less 
statistically significant in general and in particular when all competition variables are 
introduced in one specification (not reported), broadly confirm the findings in the three-day 
window. ∆Efficiency Defense and the interaction of ∆Efficiency Defense with log(Bank 
Assets) turn statistically significant negative/positive in all four specifications. This result is 
in line with the findings in Hughes and Mester [1998] for example that larger banks benefit 
from efficiency gains in risk management. 
Finally, we investigate if the results are robust to our specific assignment of values to the 
competition variables in the model. While we surmise that our ordinal rankings provide an 
adequate characterization of the legal arrangements of competition control, we cannot know 
if our assignment of cardinal values equidistantly is the most appropriate. Hence, we square 
and (in another set of specifications) take the square root of all competition variables. 
Results are mostly unaffected and are not reported.  
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VII.  Conclusion 
In the last three decades competition policy has been substantially strengthened. We 
construct an event study around the announcements of legislative changes governing 
competition reviews of mergers and acquisitions in a sample of nineteen industrial countries 
over the period 1987-2004. In line with our predictions, stock prices of non-financial firms 
react negatively to the announcement of a change strengthening competition control 
whereas banks’ stock prices react unexpectedly positively. The cross-sectional exercise 
suggests that the differential responses of banks and firms to the announcements of 
legislative changes in competition control can be explained, at least partly, by the specific 
institutional environment of the banking sector that already existed before the introduction 
of the competition review. 
The supervisory focus on stability, discretionary “sound and prudent” management 
provisions, an affinity for avoiding or deferring bank failures (Kroszner and Strahan [1996] 
and Brown and Dinc [2005]), and a penchant for confidentiality may prevent efficient entry, 
restructuring and consolidation from taking place in the banking sector. The robust 
relevancy of a variable capturing the publication of the decisions of the supervisory process 
in all cross-sectional specifications suggests that the transparency of the merger review 
process is a particular important feature of the supervisory regime. 
The idea is that investors anticipate that the introduction of an independent and 
transparent control reduces the discretion of the regulatory process and enhances the 
efficiency of envisioned bank M&As. In particular, more profitable target banks can be 
engaged, also by foreign acquirers, presumably leading to more efficient combinations. 
Overall the results show that the supervisory control of bank mergers may have important 
implications for real activity as it has significant effects on investors’ evaluations.  
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Our results should not be interpreted as meaning that the supervisory control is 
problematic per se or that it is generally badly implemented. Neither can one infer from our 
results that competition policy is always and everywhere “wholesome” and never swayed by 
institutional or political agendas (Duso, Neven and Röller [2006], Aktas, De Bodt and Roll 
[2004], Aktas, de Bodt and Roll [2007]). Rather, our results suggest that the discretion 
which can be pursued under the objective of “sound and prudent management” of the 
supervisory control may hurt the evaluations of banks and the expectations of the investors. 
The importance of the transparency of the supervisory process as a way to improve the 
supervisory control is in line with the results in a survey on obstacles to cross-border 
consolidation conducted by the European Commission: The “misuse of supervisory power” 
is an important obstacle to cross-border mergers. Consequently, the Commission has 
advanced formal proposals to revise the Banking Directive governing the supervisory 
control of M&As, in order to make supervisory control more uniform and more transparent 
(see for example European_Commission [2005]). 
Our analysis can be extended in several directions. An important area for future research 
is to assess the stability implications of the more competition oriented reviews in the 
banking sector. This extension would allow for an overall welfare evaluation of the 
observed policy changes. It would also add to the active debate about whether there is a 
trade-off or complementarity between competition and stability in banking. 
Another interesting question for future research is whether the strengthening in 
competition control similarly affects firms in a wider range of sectors that are also subject 
to special regulators (such as energy, health-care, and telecom for example). It should be 
noted, however, that if this was the case the special effects on banks we find would stand  
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out even more, as the negative impact on non-financial firms should be higher if other 
special sectors were excluded from them.  
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 FIGURE 1. TIME LINE OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE AND EVENTS 
The figure reports the various steps in the procedure creating the competition control laws and the corresponding events used in this study. The boxes list the type of event 
and between parentheses the number of events. 
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Earliest Date FIGURE 2. RECENT EVENTS IN ITALY AND CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS ON ITALIAN BANK STOCKS 
The figure reports the cumulative abnormal returns of Italian bank stocks while the panel below reports the percentage cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for all 
exchange-listed banks in Italy (All Banks), Banca Populare Italiana (BPI), and Banca Antioniana Populare Veneta (BAPV). Excess returns are estimated using the value-
weighted Italian country index in the market model around the announcement of the indicated events. The first cell lists the CAR, the second the significance levels. The 
reported significance levels are based on standard t-tests. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, and * significant at the 10% level. 
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08.02: McCreevy warns Fazio not to block 
foreign bank takeovers
14.05: McCreevy sends Fazio letter
24.05: Kroes says she may sue Italy
11.07: BI approves BPI proposal
30.07: BI suspends BPI approval
23.09: Berlusconi calls on Fazio to resign
19.12: Fazio resigns
22.12: House approves law with transfer
Event Date CAR(0, 2) CAR(0, 20) CAR(0, 60)
1 McCreevy warns Fazio not to block foreign takeovers 8-Feb-05 1.21 0.54 0.79 3.23 -1.53 10.47 * 10.62 ** -5.38 25.54 ***
2 Banca d' Italia aproves proposal of BPI to acquire control of BAPVJuly 11, 2005 0.92 4.23 -0.77 -0.04 2.58 -8.18 -5.40 47.93 ** -27.57 *
3 Banca d' Italia suspends proposal given to BPI July 30, 2005 0.03 -3.11 -0.45 0.59 -7.51 3.87 5.87 -58.15 *** 28.29 *
4 Berlusconi calls on Fazio to resign September 23, 2005 0.05 -1.27 -0.94 4.89 * -25.73 *** 4.04 6.59 -3.23 -8.12
5 Fazio resigns / House approves law with transfer December 19-22, 2005 1.67 * 11.02 *** -0.92 0.31 17.17 ** -1.65 5.03 28.64 ** -7.37
BPI BAPV All Banks All Banks BPI BAPV BPI BAPV All Banks 
 
TABLE 1. COMPETITION CONTROL ACROSS THE SAMPLE COUNTRIES ON JANUARY 1
ST, 1987 AND ON JULY 1
ST, 2004 
The table defines the key competition control variables and reports values for the sample countries on January 1
st, 1987 and as of July 1
st, 2004. We use two-letter ISO codes to 
indicate countries (that are alphabetized according to the country names). Lightly shaded countries experience no changes and are consequently not included in the event study. 
Country  AT  BE  CA  DK  EU  FI  FR  DE  GR  IE  IT  NL  NO  PT  ES  SE  CH  UK  US 
Competition Criteria                                       
What assessment criteria are used in 
competition control? 
1=only competition criteria; ½=also other criteria; 0=none, no competition control 
January 1, 1987 0  0  1  0  0  0  1  1  0  0.5  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0.5  1 
July 1, 2004 0.5  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  0.75  1  1  1  1  0.5  0.75  1  1  1 
Competition Enforcer                                       
Who is (are) the decision-making agency(ies) 
for competition control? 
1=antitrust authority or court; 4/5=multiple antitrust agencies; 3/5=antitrust and other agencies (e.g., minister); 
2/5=only other agencies (e.g., minister); 1/5=sector regulator; 0= none, no competition control 
January 1, 1987 0  0  0.8  0  0  0  0.4  1  0  0.4  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0.4  0.8 
July 1, 2004 1  1  0.8  0.8  1  0.8  0.4  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  0.4  0.8  1  0.8  0.8 
Competition Overturning                                       
Can a third agency intervene in the process 
and replace / overturn the decision-making 
agency(ies)? 
1=not possible; 2/3=public (ex-post) overturning of case-specific decisions; 1/3 =appropriation of decision-making 
power; 0= none, no competition control 
January 1, 1987 0  0  1  0  0  0  1  0.66  0  0.66  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  1 
July 1, 2004 1  0.66  1  1  0.8  1  1  0.66  0.66  1  1  0.66  0.66  0.66  1  1  0.66  0.5  1 
Mandatory Notification                                       
Is merger notification mandatory above 
(statutory) thresholds? 
1=yes; 1/2=no; 0=none, no competition control 
January 1, 1987 0  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0.5  1 
July 1, 2004 1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  0.5  1  
 
TABLE 2. CHANGES IN COMPETITION CONTROL AND LEVELS OF SUPERVISORY CONTROL 
The table reports the changes in the key competition control variables and the levels of the key supervisory control variables. 
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A ustria January 1, 1993 0.5 1 1 1 1 1 0.2 0.2 1 0.66
B elgium A ugust 5, 1991 1 1 0.66 1 1 0 1 0 1 0.33
D enm ark M ay 26, 2000 1 0.8 1 1 1 1 0.6 1 1 0.66
E U D ecem ber 21, 1989 1 1 0.8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
F inland A pril 30, 1998 1 0.8 1 1 1 1 0.2 1 0.5 0.66
F rance M ay 15, 2001 0 0 0 0.5 1 1 0.8 0.8 1 0.33
F rance A ugust 1, 2003 0 0 0 0.5 1 1 0.8 0.8 1 0.83
G reece M arch 8, 1991 1 1 0.66 1 1 1 0.8 0.8 1 0.66
Ireland A pril 10, 2002 0.25 0.6 0.34 0 1 0.5 0.2 0.4 1 0.66
Italy O ctober 10, 1990 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.8 0.8 1 0.66
N etherlands M arch 20, 1997 1 1 0.66 1 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 1 0.66
N orw ay June 9, 1993 1 1 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.66
N orw ay M arch 2, 2004 0 0 -0.34 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.66
P ortugal A pril 10, 2003 0 0.6 -0.34 0 1 1 0.8 0.8 1 0.66
S pain July 17, 1989 0.5 0.4 1 0.5 1 1 0.2 0.8 1 0.66
S pain A pril 16, 1999 0 0 0 0.5 1 1 0.2 0.8 1 0.66
S w eden D ecem ber 17, 1992 0.5 0.8 1 1 1 0 0.2 0 0.5 0.66
S w eden A pril 1, 2000 0.25 0 0 0 1 1 0.6 1 0.5 0.66
S w itzerland O ctober 6, 1995 1 1 0.66 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.5
U K N ovem ber 5, 2002 0.5 0.4 -0.5 0 1 1 1 1 0.75 1
C h an g es in  C o m p etitio n  C o n tro l L evel o f S u p erviso ry C o n tro l 
 
TABLE 3. CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR FIRMS AND BANKS AROUND CHANGES IN COMPETITION POLICY 
Percentage cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for exchange-listed firms and banks are estimated around the announcement of changes in competition policy using the value-
weighted country (European, world) index in the market model. The first row in each cell lists the CAR averaged across events while the second row reports (in italics) the number of 
positive versus (“:”) the number of negative CARs. The reported significance levels are based on standard t-tests (for the differences assuming unequal variances) and sign tests. The 
third row in the difference cells reports the difference between bank and firm positives and firm and bank negatives and the significance level of the Fisher’s exact test of 
independence assessing the number of firm positives/negatives versus bank positives/negatives (one-sided). 
Change in Control (Number of Cases)    [-120,0]  [-60,0]  [-20,0]  [-2,0]  [1, 2]  [1,20]  [1,60]  [1,120] 
Country Market Index                                 
                                 
Event (20)  Banks  8.3 
13:7 
  5.0 
13:7 
*  2.3 
14:6 
* 
* 
0.8 
16:4 
 
*** 
0.1 
11:9 
  -0.7 
11:9 
  1.7 
10:10 
  8.5 
11:9 
 
  Firms  -2.8 
6:14 
* 
* 
-2.5 
6:14 
** 
* 
-1.0 
6:14 
** 
* 
-0.3 
5:15 
 
** 
-0.1 
10:10 
  -0.2 
9:11 
  -0.9 
10:10 
  -1.7 
8:12 
 
  Banks \ Firms  11.1 
13:7 
7:7 
* 
 
** 
7.6 
13:7 
7:7 
*** 
 
** 
3.3 
14:6 
8:8 
** 
* 
** 
1.1 
15:5 
11:11 
* 
** 
*** 
0.2 
12:8 
1:1 
  -0.5 
11:9 
2:2 
  2.6 
10:10 
0:0 
  10.2 
11:9 
3:3 
* 
Implementation (20)  Banks  5.4 
10:10 
  3.4 
12:8 
  1.6 
13:7 
  0.7 
9:11 
  0.6 
11:9 
  3.2 
12:8 
  1.7 
10:10 
  2.3 
8:12 
 
  Firms  -0.9 
10:10 
 
 
-1.2 
7:13 
* 
* 
-0.6 
6:14 
* 
* 
-0.2 
10:10 
* 
 
-0.1 
8:12 
  0.1 
10:10 
  -0.1 
6:14 
 
* 
0.2 
12:8 
 
  Banks \ Firms  6.3 
10:10 
0:0 
  4.6 
11:9 
5:4 
  2.2 
14:6 
8:8 
 
* 
** 
1.0 
10:10 
-1:-1 
  0.6 
12:8 
3:3 
  1.1 
11:9 
2:2 
  3.3 
13:7 
4:4 
  2.1 
8:12 
-4:-4 
 
Country & European Market Index 
EU                                 
                                 
Event (20)  Banks \ Firms  10.9 
12:8 
*  8.3 
13:7 
***  3.6 
14:6 
** 
* 
1.2 
16:4 
* 
*** 
0.2 
12:8 
  -0.3 
14:6 
 
* 
3.2 
12:8 
  9.8 
14:6 
* 
* 
Implementation (20)  Banks \ Firms  7.2 
8:12 
  5.2 
12:8 
  2.5 
13:7 
*  1.0 
10:10 
  0.6 
12:8 
  1.5 
11:9 
  4.1 
13:7 
  1.7 
8:12 
 
World Market Index                                 
                                 
                                 
Event (20)  Banks \ Firms  7.9 
10:10 
  6.9 
13:7 
  4.3 
14:6 
 
* 
1.0 
13:7 
**  0.3 
12:8 
  -0.2 
11:9 
  2.4 
13:7 
  10.0 
13:7 
* 
Implementation (20)  Banks \ Firms  4.1 
8:12 
  4.6 
11:9 
  2.9 
15:5 
* 
** 
1.2 
12:8 
**  0.7 
10:10 
  1.1 
12:8 
  3.5 
13:7 
  1.3 
7:13 
 
Case Weakening Competition Control 
France, May 16
th, 2003 
                               
                                 
  Banks  6.3    0.4    -0.0    -0.8  ***  -0.1  *  -2.4    -1.9    -12.1   
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, and * significant at the 10% level. 
EU World Market Index in case of an EU event. 
 
TABLE 4. CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR FIRMS AND BANKS AROUND CHANGES IN COMPETITION POLICY, BY EVENT 
The percentage cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for exchange-listed firms and banks are estimated prior to the announcement of changes in competition policy using the value-
weighted country (European) index in the market model. The table lists countries, event dates, and the CARs for three representative event windows. The reported significance levels 
are based on standard F-tests of the summation of the estimated coefficients on the event dummies (country), standard t-tests for the averages and sign tests for the medians. 
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, and * significant at the 10% level. 
C o u n try E ve n t D ate
A u stria Ja n ua ry 1, 1 99 3 -5 .3 -4.2 -3.6 *** 7 .7 7 .6 10 .1 ***
B e lg ium A ug u st 5, 1 99 1 0 .6 -0.1 0.0 -2 .6 -0 .5 0 .5 ***
D e nm a rk M ay 2 6, 2 00 0 -3 .3 -0.7 -0.1 1 7 .7 3 .0 0 .6
E U D e cem b er 2 1, 1 98 9 -1 .0 -0.4 -0.1 *** 2 .7 -0 .1 -0 .3 ***
F in la n d A pril 3 0, 1 99 8 0 .4 0.1 0.2 *** 6 .2 0 .5 0 .1
F ra nce M ay 1 5, 2 00 1 0 .2 0.1 -0.1 * 2 .3 -2 .1 1 .1 ***
F ra nce A ug u st 1, 2 00 3 -0 .2 -0.6 * -0.1 *** -2 .4 1 .1 0 .5 ***
G re ece M arch 8, 1 99 1 -3 .0 -2.4 -0.2 1 .0 0 .8 0 .3 ***
Irela nd A pril 1 0, 2 00 2 -19 .7 ** -4.7 *** -0.5 *** 2 7 .4 ** 5 .4 ** 0 .5 ***
Ita ly O cto b er 1 0, 1 99 0 -6 .2 *** -1.2 * -0.3 *** 6 .7 * 0 .0 0 .2
N e th erla nd s M a rch  2 0, 1 99 7 -0 .5 0.4 0.6 *** -1 .6 -2 .8 -1 .0 ***
N o rw a y Ju n e 9, 1 99 3 -3 .2 -0.3 -0.1 ** 2 8 .5 0 .2 0 .7
N o rw a y M arch 2, 2 00 4 1 .6 0.3 0.0 -1 2 .6 -2 .4 0 .1
P o rtu g al A pril 1 0, 2 00 3 3 .0 3.8 * -0.2 ** -7 .7 -8 .0 * 0 .3 *
S p a in Ju ly 1 7, 1 98 9 2 .3 0.4 0.1 *** -1 .5 0 .2 -0 .1
S p a in A pril 1 6, 1 99 9 -8 .4 ** -5.8 ** -1.8 *** 1 5 .6 ** 10 .5 ** 3 .1 ***
S w ed e n D e cem b er 1 7, 1 99 2 -1 .9 -0.2 0.1 1 4 .0 14 .3 -3 .0 ***
S w ed e n A p ril 1, 2 00 0 -2 .1 -1.0 0.0 -7 .3 7 .0 0 .4
S w itze rla n d O cto be r 6, 1 99 5 -2 .0 -1.5 0.0 2 .8 4 .7 0 .2 ***
U K N o ve m be r 5, 2 00 2 -1 .6 -2.7 *** -0.6 *** 4 .0 6 .7 * 1 .5 ***
A verag e -2 .5 ** -1.0 ** -0.3 5 .0 * 2 .3 * 0 .8
M e d ia n -1 .8 * -0.5 * -0.1 ** 2 .7 0 .7 * 0 .3 ***
(-20 ,0 ) (-2 ,0 ) (-6 0 ,0 )
B a n k s F irm s
(-6 0,0) (-2 0,0) (-2,0) 
 
TABLE 5. VARIABLES USED IN THE CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL BANK CARS FOLLOWING CHANGES IN COMPETITION POLICY 
The table lists the variables that are used in the cross-sectional analysis to explain individual bank CARs. 
Mean StDev Min Max Obs
Supervisory Criteria What assessment criteria are used in supervisory merger/acquisition control? 0.61 0.46 0 1 323
1=only supervisory criteria (stability, soundness, prudency); ½=also other criteria; 0=none, 
no supervisory merge  control in banking
Supervisory Enforcer Who is (are) the decision-making agency(ies) for supervisory merger/acquisition control? 0.44 0.38 0 1 323
1= independent supervisor; 4/5=central bank; 3/5= independent supervisor and minister; 
2/5=central bank and minister; 1/5=minister; 0=none, no supervisory acquisition control in 
banking
Supervisory Formal Decisions Not Public Are supervisory decisions following formal notification public? 0.60 0.45 0 1 323
1=no; 1/2=yes; 0=no supervisory control
Supervisory Informal Notification Is there any informal communication and/or notification between the supervisory agency(ies) 
and the parties before formal notification?
0.43 0.33 0 1 323
1=yes, formally in the law and mandatory; 2/3=yes, but only as common practise; 1/3=no 
notification; 0=no supervisory control
Efficiency Defense Are efficiency gains explicitly considered as a factor mitigating anticompetitive effects? 0.33 0.47 0 1 323
1=yes; 0=no
National Markets Are relevant markets defined from a geographical point of view at least as national markets 
(i.e., no markets are local)?
0.12 0.33 0 1 323
1=yes; 2/3=possible, but not defined; 1/3=no; 0=no competition control in banking
C3 Percentage assets of largest three banks in the national market 0.32 0.38 0 1 323
Corruption Assessment of corruption within the political system 4.85 0.97 2.25 6 323
Accounts for financial corruption (e.g., demands for special payments and bribes connected 
with import and export licenses) and actual/potential corruption in the form of excessive 
patronage, nepotism, job reservations, ‘favor-for-favors’, secret party funding, and 
suspiciously close ties between politics and business. Source: International Country Risk 
Guide
6=not corrupt; …; 1=very corrupt
Bureaucracy Quality Assessment of the quality of the bureaucracy 3.75 0.47 2.167 4 323
Accounts for the strength and expertise of the bureaucracy to govern without drastic changes 
in policy or interruptions in government services. In that case the bureaucracy tends to be 
somewhat autonomous from political pressure and to have an established mechanism for 
recruitment and training. Source: International Country Risk Guide
4=high quality; …; 1=low quality 
 
Bank Assets (in bln Euros) of the individual banks 55.98 135.20 0.11 709.33 226
% Interest Income of the individual banks 0.35 0.91 -0.09 5.33 226
% ROA of the individual banks 1.06 0.93 -1.88 6.47 164
Supervisory Independence from Banks The degree to which the supervisory authority is protected by the legal system from the 
banking industry
0.25 0.43 0 1 323
Are supervisors legally liable for their actions? Source: Barth, Caprio, Levine
1=independent; 0=dependent
Supervisory Independence from Politicians The degree to which the supervisory authority is independent within the government from 
political influence
0.58 0.49 0 1 323
To whom are the supervisory bodies responsible or accountable? How is the head of the 
supervisory agency (and other directors) appointed? How is the head of the supervisory agency 
(and other directors) removed? Source: Barth, Caprio, Levine
1=independent; 0=dependent 
 
TABLE 6. CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL BANK CARS FOLLOWING CHANGES IN COMPETITION POLICY 
The dependent variable is the three-day percentage cumulative abnormal return, CAR(-2,0), for exchange-listed banks estimated prior to changes in competition policy using 
the value-weighted country index in the market model. All models include regional random effects. 
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, and * significant at the 10% level. 
Model I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Supervisory Criteria 1.32 ** -2.00 -1.97 -0.54 -2.55
(0.67) (1.46) (1.47) (1.29) (1.67)
Supervisory Enforcer 1.60 *** 1.47 1.45 0.00 1.49
(0.54) (0.95) (0.96) (0.00) (1.06)
Supervisory Formal Decisions Not Public 2.82 *** 3.80 ** 3.90 ** 4.55 ** 5.25 ***
(0.93) (1.67) (1.71) (1.88) (2.00)
Supervisory Informal Notification -0.79 -0.92 -1.07 -1.18 -1.01
(0.92) (0.97) (1.13) (1.02) (1.20)
∆Efficiency Defense -0.42 -0.73 -1.02 0.25 -1.30 -1.31 -1.84 -2.80
(1.75) (1.72) (1.72) (1.74) (1.73) (1.74) (1.87) (2.15)
∆Efficiency Defense * log(Bank Assets) 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.20
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13)
∆National Markets * C3 -0.49 -0.28 -1.48 ** -0.58 -1.75 ** -1.76 ** -2.40 *** -2.32 **
(0.51) (0.50) (0.61) (0.54) (0.83) (0.86) (0.83) (0.96)
Corruption -0.03 -0.11 0.21 -0.07 0.18 0.21 0.40 0.28
(0.17) (0.16) (0.18) (0.17) (0.22) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25)
Bureaucracy Quality -0.15
(0.62)
log(Bank Assets) 0.27 0.33 0.39 0.34 0.49 0.48 -0.03 0.00
(0.53) (0.52) (0.51) (0.53) (0.52) (0.53) (0.72) (0.94)
log(Bank Assets)
2 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
% Interest Income * log(Bank Assets) -0.04 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03)
% ROA * log(Bank Assets) -10.07
(10.46)
Constant -2.05 -2.06 -4.76 -0.83 -4.75 -4.30 -2.73 -1.77
(4.14) (4.09) (4.16) (4.23) (4.38) (5.03) (5.67) (7.50)
Number of Observations 226 226 226 226 226 226 219 161
Adjusted R-squared 0.08 0.03 0.13 0.08 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.16 
 
TABLE 7. CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL BANK CARS FOLLOWING CHANGES IN COMPETITION CONTROL: FURTHER ROBUSTNESS 
The dependent variable is the three-day or twenty-one-day percentage cumulative abnormal return, CAR(-2,0) or CAR(-20,0), for exchange-listed banks estimated prior to 
changes in competition control using the value-weighted country index in the market model. All models include regional random effects. 
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, and * significant at the 10% level. 
M od el I II III IV V V I
D ependent V ariab le (-2,0) (-2 ,0) (-2 0,0) (-20,0) (-20,0) (-20,0 )
S uperviso ry C riteria -1.4 1 -2.67 8.16 ***
(1.43) (2.33) (2 .39)
S uperviso ry E nfo rcer 8 .79 ***
(2.25 )
S uperviso ry Independ ence from  B anks -0.1 1
(0.51)
S uperviso ry Independ ence from  P oliticians 0.91
(1.27)
S uperviso ry F orm al D ecisions N o t P ublic 6.2 9 *** 6.66 *** 6 .94 *
(2.12) (2.16) (3.9 6)
S uperviso ry Inform al N otification -1.4 4 -1.46 4 .42
(1.22) (1.17) (4.21 )
∆ E fficiency D efense -2.9 3 -2.33 -31.26 *** -31 .39 *** -30 .09 *** -26 .44 ***
(2.20) (2.27) (8 .50) (8.22 ) (9.0 5) (8.96 )
∆ E fficiency D efense * lo g(B ank A ssets) 0.2 1 0.18 1.82 *** 1 .77 *** 1 .78 *** 1 .56 ***
(0.13) (0.14) (0 .53) (0.51 ) (0.5 6) (0.56 )
∆ N atio nal M arkets * C 3 -3.0 1 *** -3.47 *** 3.40 4 .29 ** 1 .36 4 .32 *
(0.94) (1.18) (2 .23) (2.12 ) (2.8 7) (2.43 )
C orruption 0.4 8 * 0.53 * -0.70 -1 .02 -0.25 -0 .69
(0.28) (0.28) (0 .70) (0.64 ) (0.8 7) (0.80 )
log(B ank A ssets) 0.0 0 -0.03 -4.50 -4 .27 -2.85 -2 .32
(0.94) (0.94) (3 .89) (3.83 ) (3.9 4) (3.94 )
log(B ank A ssets)
2 0.0 0 0.00 0.11 0 .11 0 .06 0 .04
(0.03) (0.03) (0 .13) (0.12 ) (0.1 3) (0.13 )
%  Interest Incom e * lo g(B ank A ssets) -0.0 3 -0.03 -0.03 -0 .04 -0.03 -0 .02
(0.04) (0.04) (0 .04) (0.04 ) (0.0 3) (0.03 )
%  R O A * lo g(B ank A ssets) -7.5 2 -7.74 -3.10 -7 .60 -5.06 -3 .49
(1 0.61) (10.31) (10 .54) (10.54 ) (10.1 6) (10.63 )
C onstant -3.1 0 -3.22 40.75 41 .68 28 .80 28 .64
(7.59) (7.57) (30 .03) (29.84 ) (30.6 9) (31.02 )
N um ber o f O b servations 16 1 161 161 161 161 161
A djusted R -squared 0.1 6 0.16 0.16 0 .16 0 .13 0 .13 
 
APPENDIX 1: PUBLICLY AVAILABLE SOURCES DEALING WITH COMPETITION CONTROL AND SUPERVISORY CONTROL OF MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS IN BANKING 
The table reports the sources we have used to collect the legal and institutional country characteristics on general competition control and supervisory control of mergers and 
acquisitions in banking. We report only documents and sources other than the laws. 
     
Country  Source  Www 
     
All  Getting the Deal Through, Merger Control  http://www.gettingthedealthrough.com/main_fs.cfm?book=MergerControl 
  International Competition Network, Merger Review Laws, Related 
Materials, and Templates. 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/mergercontrollaws.html 
  OECD, Competition.  http://www.oecd.org/infobycountry/0,2646,en_2649_37463_1_1_1_1_37463,00.html 
  OECD, Competition Law and Policy.  http://www.oecd.org/infobycountry/0,2646,en_2649_34685_1_1_1_1_1,00.html 
  OECD, 1996, Failing Firm Defence, CLP Report, (96)23, Paris.   
  OECD, 1998, Enhancing the Role of Competition in Bank Regulation, 
DAFFE/CLP Report, (98)16, Paris. 
 
  OECD, 1999, Relationship between Regulators and Competition 
Authorities, DAFFE/CLP Report, (99)8, Paris. 
 
  OECD, 2000, Mergers in Financial Services, DAFFE/CLP Report, 
(2000)17, Paris. 
 
  OECD, 2002, The Role of Competition Policy in Regulatory Reform, 
DAFEE/CLP Report, (2002), Paris.  
 
  World Bank and International Monetary Fund, Global Banking Law 
Database. 
http://www.gbld.org/ 
Austria  Global Competition Review, Austria  http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/ear/eur_atr.cfm 
Denmark  Global Competition Review, Denmark.  http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/ear/eur_atr.cfm 
EU  Ghezzi F. and P. Magnani, 1998, L´applicazione della disciplina antitrust 
comunitaria al settore bancario, in M. Polo (ed.), Industria Bancaria e 
Concorrenza, Il Mulino, 143-259. 
 
Finland  Finnish Competition Authority, Annual Reports, 2001, 2002, 2003.   
  Global Competition Review, Finland.  http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/ear/eur_atr.cfm 
France  Fried Frank, Client Memoranda, 2002, The New Features of French 
Antitrust Law by Eric Cafritz and Omer Tene. 
http://www.ffhsj.com/cmemos/021102_newfeat.htm 
  Global Competition Review, France: Merger Control.  http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/ear/eur_atr.cfm  
 
  Jurismag, 2001, Le magazine rédigé par des professionnels du droit, The 
New French Rules for Merger Control, by A. Condomines, Avocat à la 
Cour. 
http://www.jurismag.net/articles/artiGB-concent.htm 
  Practical Law Company, Global Council Web, Merger Control – France.  http://global.practicallaw.com/jsp/article.jsp?item=:1138832 
  Olcay Miller, P., 20004, Authorisation of Bank Mergers—Recent French 
Experience, mimeo, Queen Mary and Westfield College. 
 
Germany  Global Competition Review, Germany.  http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/ear/eur_atr.cfm 
Ireland  Global Competition Review, Ireland.  http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/ear/eur_atr.cfm 
Italy  Bianco, M., F. Ghezzi, W. Negrini and P. Signorini (1998b), 
‘Applicazioni della disciplina antitrust al settore bancario in Italia’, in M. 
Polo (ed), Industria Bancaria e Concorrenza, Bologna: Il Mulino, 329-
374. 
 
Norway  Global Competition Review, Norwegian competition law: overview and 
recent developments. 
http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/ear/eur_atr.cfm 
  International Law Office (ILO), Competition - Norway 1998, 1999, 2001, 
2004. 
http://www.internationallawoffice.com/lettersresults.cfm?Newsletters__WorkAreas=Co
mpetition 
Portugal  Global Competition Review, Portugal.  http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/ear/eur_atr.cfm 
Spain  Banco de Espana, 2001, “Basic Regulatory Structure of the Spanish 
Banking System”, Annex I to Annual Report. 
 
Sweden  Global Competition Review, Sweden.  http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/ear/eur_atr.cfm 
  International Law Office (ILO), “Competition – Sweden”.  http://www.internationallawoffice.com/lettersresults.cfm?Newsletters__WorkAreas=Co
mpetition 
US  Bianco, M., F. Ghezzi and P. Magnani, 1998a, “L’applicazione della 
disciplina antitrust nel settore bancario statunitense”, in M. Polo (ed), 
Industria Bancaria e Concorrenza, Bologna: Il Mulino, 143-258. 
 
  
 
APPENDIX 2. CONTACTED AGENCIES DEALING WITH COMPETITION CONTROL AND SUPERVISORY 
CONTROL OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN BANKING 
The table reports the agencies we would like to thank for helping us with the collection of the legal and institutional 
country characteristics on general competition control and supervisory control of Mergers and Acquisitions in banking. 
It is not our intention to implicate these agencies or their affiliated institutions and we consider all the remaining errors 
in the reporting as ours. For each country we order the contacts we had as follows: (1) the competition authorities, (2) 
the national supervisors and/or central banks, and if applicable (3) the European Central Bank. 
     
Country  Agency   
     
Austria  Cartel Court   
  Federal Competition Authority (of Austria)   
  Austrian Financial Market Authority (FMA)   
  European Central Bank   
Belgium  Federal Public Service Economy    
  European Central Bank   
Canada  Competition Bureau   
Denmark  Danish Competition Authority   
  Danish Financial Supervisory Authority   
Finland  Finnish Competition Authority   
  European Central Bank   
France  Queen Mary and Westfield College   
  European Central Bank   
Germany  German Competition Authority   
  Deutsche Bundesbank   
  European Central Bank   
Greece  Hellenic Competition Authority   
  Bank of Greece   
  European Central Bank   
Ireland  Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment   
  Irish Competition Authority   
Italy  Italian Competition Authority   
  Bank of Italy   
Netherlands  Netherlands Competition Authority   
  Nederlandsche Bank   
Norway  Norwegian Competition Authority   
  Ministry of Finance   
  Norges Bank   
Portugal  Portuguese Competition Authority   
  European Central Bank   
Spain  Banco de Espana   
  European Central Bank   
Sweden  Swedish Competition Authority   
  Finansinspektionen   
UK  Office of Fair Trading   
  Financial Service Authority   
  European Central Bank   
US  Federal Reserve Board
   
 
    
 
APPENDIX 3. LEGAL AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN ITALY AND EUROPE IN 2005 
BAPV: Banca Antioniana Populare Veneta, Berlusconi: prime minister of Italy; BI: Banca d’ Italia, BPI: Banca Populare Italiana; CONSOB: the stock market regulator; EC: 
European Commission; Fazio: former governor of the Banca d’ Italia; Govt: Government; McCreevy is the European Internal Market Commissioner; Kroes is the European 
Competition Commissioner. 
 
Law Transfer Competition Control 
 
14.01: Govt proposes law WITHOUT transfer, but 
  Parliamentary Committee will add it 
03.03: Lower House votes NOT to transfer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
03.09: Govt proposes law WITHOUT transfer, but 
Press expects Senate to add it 
11.10: Senate approves law WITHOUT transfer 
 
ABN AMRO versus BPI for BAPV 
 
12.01: ABN Amro seeks new shareholder pact to 
control BAPV 
21.01: BPI seeks to split BAPV to acquire control 
 
 
11.07: BI approves proposal BPI to acquire BAPV 
 
25.07: Court confiscates shares of BPI & allies 
CONSOB suspends BPI’s bid 
30.07: BI suspends BPI approval 
01.08: House arrest for BPI top management 
 
23.09: Berlusconi calls on Fazio to resign 
15.10: BI cancels BPI approval 
19.10: ABN Amro wins bid 
 
19.12: Fazio resigns 
European Commission 
 
08.02: McCreevy warns Fazio against blocking 
foreign bank takeovers 
12.02: Fazio says cross-border banking mergers can 
be “difficult” 
 
14.05: McCreevy sends letter with concerns 
24.05: Kroes says she may sue Italy 
22.12: Lower House approves law WITH transfer 
23.12: Senate approves law WITH transfer 
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